![]() replace ( / /g, ' %20 ' ) var repoloc window. Var apploc = ' /Applications/Visual Studio Code.app/Contents/Resources/app/ '. In fact, our payload can be placed inside the malicious repository, together with the Jupyter Notebook file that triggers the XSS.Īfter a couple of hours of trial-and-error, I discovered that we can obtain a reference of the img tag triggering the XSS by forcing the execution during the onload event. Similarly to their exploit, we can attempt to leverage a postMessage’s reply to leak the path of current user directory. In exploiting CVE-2021-43908, TheGrandPew and s1r1us use a path traversal to load arbitrary files outside of VSCode installation path. The answer comes from a recent presentation I watched at the latest Black Hat USA 2022 briefings. So, how do we place our arbitrary HTML/JS content within the application install folder?Īlternatively, can we reference resources outside that folder? ![]() With that, we can simply execute code using something like top.require('child_process').exec('open /System/Applications/Calculator.app') As long as the content loaded within the webview is also hosted on the local filesystem (within the app folder), we can access the top window. ![]() Thanks to the allow-same-origin attribute, this limitation is lifted. ![]() Allow - scripts allow - same - origin allow - forms allow - pointer - lock allow - downloadsīy default, sandbox makes the browser treat the iframe as if it was coming from another origin, even if its src points to the same site. ![]()
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